Volume 18
Issue 2 Spring 1978
Spring 1978

Regulating Competition: Government Intervention in the U.S.
Refining Industry, 1948-1975, by Anthony E. Copp and The
Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest, by
Robert Engler
Stephen L. McDonald

Recommended Citation
Stephen L. McDonald, Regulating Competition: Government Intervention in the U.S. Refining Industry,
1948-1975, by Anthony E. Copp and The Brotherhood of Oil: Energy Policy and the Public Interest, by
Robert Engler, 18 Nat. Resources J. 454 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol18/iss2/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

REGULATING COMPETITION:
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE U.S.
REFINING INDUSTRY, 1948-1975
by
ANTHONY E. COPP
College Station and London, Texas A&M University Press, 1976.
Pp. 280+xxiv, $14.50.

THE BROTHERHOOD OF OIL:
ENERGY POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
by
ROBERT ENGLER
Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1977.
Pp. 337+xi, $12.50.
These two books represent contrasting approaches to the problem
of past, present, and future energy policy. The first is written by an
economist who ascribes the failures of past policy to misconceptions
and contradictions which can be explained in analytical terms. The
other is written by a political scientist who, obviously concerned
with the applications of power, condemns past policy as the work of
an unholy alliance of business and government. Copp calls for a more
rational approach to future policy; Engler for a broader public participation in the policy planning process.
Copp's Regulating Competition in Oil primarily deals with oil
import controls and related refinery regulations, 1954-1973. He interprets the program as based on considerations of national security
and competition in the domestic refining industry. Specifically,
greater national security was the aim of import limitations, while the
tool selected (import quotas, as distinguished from a tariff) and the
allocation system (weighted to favor smaller refineries) were designed
to preserve or enhance refiner competition. Copp traces the history
of the program and describes its workings in detail. This in itself is a
significant contribution to the literature.
However, of more interest for the future is Copp's analysis of the
reasons for the failure and abandonment of the import control program on the eve of OPEC's four-fold increase in the world price of
crude oil and the creation of a new set of policy problems for the
United States. He argues at page 104 that the program was based on
five assumptions "that either were basically false or became false
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during the period 1948-1975." These assumptions were that the U.S.
had and would keep a cushion of spare producing capacity, that the
supply of foreign oil was perfectly elastic, that the joint-product
nature of oil and gas could be ignored, that a "healthy" oil industry
required the survival of small refiners, and that regulation could supplant the market system.
The immediate cause of the abandonment of the import control
system was, of course, the exhaustion of spare domestic crude oil
capacity (which had loomed so large when the program was aborning), so that the import quota plus domestic supply could no longer
satisfy domestic demand at prices that were politically acceptable.
Why did that spare capacity disappear? It is in answering this question that, in the opinion of this reviewer, Copp's analysis is weakest.
He surely is right in pointing to such factors as the regulation of
natural gas prices (the joint product effect) and the reduction of tax
incentives (after 1969), but he could have made his analysis more
complete and more satisfying if he had addressed himself directly to
the problem of how the domestic crude oil price was determined
when the prorationing authorities adjusted supply to demand at
whatever price prevailed. Why did not the domestic price of crude oil
rise sufficiently to maintain the profitability of domestic exploration
as demand grewrelative to existing capacity?
It is not enough to say that there was no reason for the price to
rise so long as there was spare capacity and the state prorationing
authorities allowed supply to increase in step with demand. For if
quantity supplied is equated with quantity demanded at whatever
price prevails, then the price is indeterminate in terms of the usual
market analysis. Either the prorationing authorities had a price objective (but why would they wish to hold down prices?) or the price is
administered by the major refiner-buyers in the industry on the basis
of considerations that neither Copp nor anyone else has made clear.
This is the issue that needs attention, and it is too bad that Copp,
with his technical skill and wealth of knowledge about the industry,
does not address himself directly to it.
But where do we go from here? Copp accepts the national security
argument as a premise of future policy. He advocates greater private
and public effort in the area of research and development, looking to
a "breakthrough" that will allow more thorough exploitation of the
nation's remaining oil and gas resources, creation of an emergency
reserve of producing and refining capacity, and deregulation of natural gas prices. He notes a number of other measures to "be considered," ranging from mandatory development of light cars to re-
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laxation of air standards that limit the substitution of coal for oil and
gas. And in general he would rely more on the market system to
guide consumption and the allocation of productive resources.
The primary theme of Engler's The Brotherhood of Oil is that a
monopolistic oil and gas industry and government in the United
States have been and are in league to protect prices and profits, and
that the nation's (and world's) energy problems, some artificially
contrived by the corporate giants, can be solved only by broadly
participatory public planning and control. Thus:
The giants continue to share a community of interest which is
guarded through patents, banking ties, common capital underwriters
and accounting services, interlocking directorships through a third
firm, bidding understandings in relation to public lands, recognized
territorial prerogatives, crude oil and product exchange arrangements, and price fixing (p. 22).

[T] he free market in energy remains a myth (p. 48).
Public government's role has remained consistent over the years: to
support the oil industry's management of production, that is, to help

keep prices up and profits secure (p. 84).
Congress and the president should create a temporary national energy committee with the specific mandate to develop alternative

approaches for public control and for the transition requirements for
phasing out private control (p. 214).
Engler's method of argument is to make a statement, such as the
first quotation above, and to cite a presumably authoritative source.
One finds neither an independent analysis of factual data by Engler
nor a discussion of the analysis that leads to his source's conclusions.
One cannot determine how the conclusions were reached, or how
they may have been qualified in the original source. One ignorant of
the issues and literature would gain the impression that Engler's
views are contested by no one, that there are no equally authoritative
sources to site in support of different conclusions-for he supplies
none. He frequently cites Congressional hearings and newspapers, but
one finds no references to professional scientific literature.
This is not to say that there is no truth in what Engler has to say.
It is indeed arguable, for instance, that governments, state as well as
federal, have used their powers to protect and assist the oil industry
on many occasions. Special tax incentives, market-demand prorationing and import controls may be interpreted in this light, although
usually it was the independent sector of the industry that benefited
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most and a legitimate public purpose- conservation, national security
-may have been involved. On the other hand, much regulation of the
industry and other acts of government, such as regulation of natural
gas prices and elimination of percentage depletion for major companies in 1975, can hardly be regarded as supportive or "friendly."
The fact is that democratic governments are pushed and pulled by
many conflicting interests, by shifting public opinion and unfolding
events, and what they do seldom consistently favors one group or
unqualifiedly promotes the public interest. A more rounded study by
Engler would have made this clear.
Quite aside from the imbalance of his argument, Engler's proposals
for reform strike this reviewer as naive. He seems to believe that
participatory public planning, including end-use planning, will solve
our energy problems. Exactly how, by what mechanism, using what
criteria, he does not say. Broad participation in a democracy is desirable, but it does not in itself assure good results. Much depends on
factual knowledge and analytical ability in the participants. Regrettably, Engler's book contributes little in the way of facts or analysis
to guide the ultimate decision-makers in the United States.
STEPHEN L. McDONALD*
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